This paper considers a market where a single seller must employ informative advertising to launch a new product of observable quality. We formulate a fairly general advertising technology that allows us to study three promotional strategies -mass, targeted and customer directed advertising. We show that when the advertising technology exhibits strong economies of targeting, property that we find empirically plausible, both the private and social incentives to use distinct advertising strategies coincide and sales are promoted through customer directed advertising.
Introduction
With the advent of the information era, advertising technologies have changed a great deal. While in the recent past firms launching new products could only reach their potential consumers by inserting advertisements in the mass media, nowadays sellers have at their disposal a vast amount of distinct advertising means, such as an array of cable and satellite radio stations and televisions, specialized magazines and newspapers, classified Internet homepages, etc. For instance, just in US, there are currently about 9,000 radio stations, 1,000 TV channels, 11,000 magazines, and 17,000 newspapers (Kotler, 2002 and Kotler and Armstrong, 1998) . These different advertising media are characterized by distinct audiences, advertising rates and advertising efficiency. As a result, sellers of new products spend a great deal of effort to carefully select those advertising means that enable them to accurately target high valuation consumers, thus extracting the greatest value from any dollar spent on product development and advertising. This leads to the question of how various advertising strategies influence the pricing and the design of new products.
We study this influence in a market where a single seller offers a product of observable quality.
Consumers are, in principle, unaware of the existence and the characteristics of the product and the monopolist uses informative advertising to promote sales. 1 We formulate a fairly general advertising technology with the distinctive feature that it allows for the distribution of advertisements to specific target audiences. In particular, the use of specialized advertising means enables the firm to focus its advertising effort on the most eager consumers. The paper addresses three questions. The first issue pertains to the optimal selection of advertising strategy. Here, we distinguish three different advertising strategies and give theoretical conditions under which they arise in equilibrium. In addition, we discuss the empirical relevance of such conditions using some data gathered by ourselves from the Dutch and Spanish Press and Publicity Handbooks. The second issue has to do with the relationship between the advertising strategy and the equilibrium price-quality choice of the seller.
Here, we find that different advertising strategies have distinct implications on the market outcome.
Finally, we ask what is the impact of the different advertising strategies on market performance from a social welfare point of view. Here, we find that these implications are sensitive to the nature of product quality. We elaborate on these results in what follows.
We first examine the seller´s equilibrium selection of advertising strategy. In this connection, we note that the advertising technology we formulate allows for three different advertising strategies:
(i) mass advertising, (ii) targeted advertising, and (iii) customer directed advertising. We say that mass advertising arises in equilibrium when the seller chooses to place ads in the general media, i.e., when advertisements are not targeted to any particular segment of consumers. We refer to targeted advertising as the case in which the monopolist segments the market by distributing ads to some fraction of the population who values the good more, leaving ignorant the rest of the potential consumers who value the good less. Finally, the seller may want to target ads only to those consumers who are willing to buy the advertised price and quality combination. We call this type of advertising strategy customer directed advertising. In addition to the nature of the target audience of these different advertising strategies, they involve the placing of ads in distinct advertising means, which, in turn, entails distinct costs and advertising effectiveness.
We find that the relative attractiveness of these advertising strategies hinges upon the interplay between advertising cost and advertising effectiveness. This relationship can be captured by the following property of an advertising technology: strong economies of targeting. We say that an advertising technology exhibits strong economies (diseconomies) of targeting if, for a given number of ad-inserts, advertising cost decreases (increases), while the number of potential buyers informed increases (decreases) as one moves from less to more specialized advertising means. This property has substantial bite in our setting; indeed, we show that when the advertising technology presents strong economies (diseconomies) of targeting, customer directed (mass) advertising arises in equilibrium. In connection with this remark, we offer some empirical evidence, gathered by ourselves from the Dutch and Spanish Press and Publicity Handbooks, supporting the view that current real-world advertising technologies present strong economies of targeting. Thus, our results seem consistent with the stylized fact reported by the marketing literature, according to which the use of mass advertising is losing importance as a marketing strategy, in favour of more specialized and targeted advertising (Kotler and Armstrong, 1998) .
Our second set of results pertains to the relationship between different advertising strategies and the market outcome. We find that the price-quality choice of the monopolist under both mass advertising and targeted advertising equals the price-quality choice under the full information benchmark. Thus, apart from the different intensities with which they are employed, these two advertising strategies have no influence on the market outcome. By contrast, under customer directed advertising, the seller brings fewer units to the market and distorts the quality and the price in a manner that hinges upon the nature of product quality.
We distinguish between two settings with respect to the nature of product quality. The first refers to a situation in which the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is higher for those consumers who have higher valuations for the good. Quality has probably such nature in those situations where extra quality means superior technical features, like, for example in the market for computers, the speed of operation of a microprocessor, the capacity of a hard disk or the size of a random access memory. Accordingly, we will refer to this type of quality as high-end quality. In this case we show that a customer directed advertising strategy is accompanied by quality upgrading; as a result, this advertising strategy leads to lower quantity, higher quality and higher price. The second setting we consider is one in which the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is lower for those consumers with higher valuations for the good. Continuing with the example of the market for computers, quality may have this nature when extra quality means provision of side services such as operating system tutorials, or home installation. We will refer to this type of quality as low-end quality. In contrast to the case of high-end quality, in this setting we find that the monopolist accompanies customer directed advertising with quality downgrading, in such a way that the market price may decrease. Further, a noteworthy result is that, as compared to full information, a monopolist who promotes sales by customer directed advertising may offer fewer units of lower quality at a higher price.
We finally focus our attention on some welfare aspects related to the use of different advertising strategies. We first show that the private and the social incentives to use a customer directed advertising strategy are somewhat aligned. Indeed, if the advertising technology presents strong economies of targeting, a social planner employs customer directed advertising to promote sales, which is consistent with the monopolist's choice. However, the private and the social incentives for quantity and quality provision are generally misaligned. In this regard, we note that, compared to a full information setting, the social planner always reduces both quantity and quality when sales are promoted through customer directed advertising. This is inconsistent with the monopolist's decision since quality upgrading follows in the case of high-end quality.
This misalignment between the private and the social incentives leads us to ask how the private adoption of customer directed advertising, rather than mass advertising, affects social welfare.
Obviously, the use of customer directed advertising increases advertising efficiency, and so the key issue is how this advertising strategy affects the monopolist's ability to exercise market power. Once again, this turns out to depend on the nature of product quality. With high-end quality, the use of customer directed advertising increases the firm's ability to exercise market power only moderately; this is because the additional margin associated with the increase in the price is partially, and in same cases fully, compensated by the increase in the quality supplied by the firm. Indeed, we provide conditions, related to the way consumers value high-end quality, under which these two effects cancel each other out so that the use of customer directed advertising only results in a higher advertising efficiency, thus in a welfare improvement. By contrast, with low-end quality the use of customer directed advertising increases the firm's ability to exercise market power substantially, even in the case where the market price is reduced, since such a reduction is necessarily accompanied by a significantly lower level of quality. Overall, we find that the use of customer directed advertising can occasionally cause a welfare loss, and that such a loss is more (less) likely in a setting with low-end (high-end) quality.
Our model is related to the literature on informative advertising. 2 This literature has distinguished between advertising that is directly informative, i.e., that conveys 'hard' information (see e.g. Bester, 1995; Bester and Petrakis, 1995; Butters, 1977; Caminal, 1996; Grossman and Shapiro, 1984 ; Moraga-González, 2000; Robert and Stahl, 1993; Shapiro, 1980; Stahl, 1994; and Stegeman, 1991) , and advertising that is indirectly informative, i.e., that functions either as a signal of private information (see e.g. Bagwell, 1988; Bagwell and Ramey, 1990; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; and Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) or else as a market coordination mechanism (see Ramey, 1994a, 1994b) . Our paper deals with informative advertising that is directly informative and thus relates to the first strand of this literature. Those papers, however, differ from ours in that they do not consider the existence of specialized advertising means that allow sellers to target advertisements to particular segments of the potential market. In this connection, it is interesting to see the profound implications that targeting possibilities may have on product quality, price and welfare in a monopoly setting. There is also a related number of papers which have studied strategic coupon targeting in various segmented markets (see e.g. Bester and Petrakis, 1996; Moraga-González and Petrakis, 1999; and Shaffer and Zhang, 1995) . In a way, these articles assume the existence of an array of advertising means that enable sellers to target discount coupons to the most price sensitive consumers. More closely related to our work are Hernández (1997), and Esteban, Gil and Hernández (2001), who also assume that a seller can target ads to high valuation consumers. These papers have compared the equilibrium price of a monopolist under mass advertising and under targeting for a given product quality and for a particular advertising technology in the spirit of that in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) . They show that the use of customer directed advertising always increases both market price and a firm´s degree of monopoly power.
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we formulate a fairly general advertising technology that encompasses others in the literature and examine the occurrence of distinct advertising strategies in equilibrium. Interestingly, the conditions under which different advertising strategies arise are simple and seem empirically testable. Secondly, we use this general advertising technology to formulate a model of targeting with endogenous product quality that delivers the novel result that a firm advertising strategy has a bearing on its product design strategy. Moreover, it turns out that the nature of quality plays a fundamental role in determining how the transition from mass to customer directed advertising affects a firm's ability to exercise market power and thus the level of social welfare. In particular, our analysis reveals that the use of customer directed advertising can lead to a lower market price and, in turn, that this advertising technology does not necessarily increase a firm's level of market power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. The distinct equilibria of our model are characterized in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the welfare implications of customer directed advertising. Section 5 provides a first attempt to examine the practical relevance of customer directed advertising. Section 6 closes the paper with a review of the main conclusions. An appendix contains all the proofs.
The model
Consider a single producer trying to sell a new good of quality s at price p in an imperfect information setting. Let Q(p, s) be the demand function under perfect information and P (q, s) the inverse demand function. As usual, assume that demand is twice differentiable, downward slopping, i.e., P 0 q (q, s) < 0, and that quality is desirable, i.e., P (q, 0) = 0 and P 0 s (q, s) > 0. Let c(s) denote the marginal cost of producing one unit of a good of quality s. We assume that production of higher qualities is more costly, i.e., c(0) = 0 and c 0 (s) > 0. 3 Consumers a priori ignore the existence, the quality and the price of the good. This implies that a potential consumer cannot be an actual buyer unless the seller invests in advertising and such a consumer is reached by the advertising campaign (Stahl, 1994) . To specify the details of 3 We also assume that P 00< 0, P 00 ss < 0, c 00 (s) > 0, which are necessary for the second order conditions to be fulfilled.
the advertising technology, it is useful to think of the demand function Q(p, s) as stemming from a unitary mass of potential consumers represented by the unit interval [0, 1]; these customers buy at most a single unit of the good. Each consumer in the unit interval has a willingness to pay x(s) for a product whose quality is s, with x 0 (s) > 0. Assume that, for a given quality s, consumers can be ordered according to the valuations they place on the good and that such valuations decrease as x increases. Under this convention, we note that the monopolist would ideally like to target advertisements to the consumers located somewhere towards the left part of the unit interval, because these are the customers who are willing to pay more for the good (Bagwell, 2001, p. 4) .
A general advertising technology:
The distinctive feature of our advertising technology is that it allows the seller to choose the target of the advertising campaign. In particular, we assume that for any t in the unit interval
, there is at least one advertising means that disperses ads to the consumers in [0, t]. We will refer to t as the target of the advertising campaign. Given a price-quality pair (p, s) such that 1 > Q(p, s) > 0, we shall distinguish among three different advertising strategies. (i) A target t = 1 picks up the case of mass advertising, i.e., advertising that is directed to the entire population of potential consumers, rather than being directed to a particular consumer segment.
(ii) A target t such that 1 > t > Q(p, s) refers to the case of targeted advertising, where the firm uses specialized media to send messages towards consumers who value its product most. 4 (iii) The case t ≤ Q(p, s) turns out to be of primary interest, since ads are targeted to potential buyers, i.e., to those consumers who are willing to buy quality s at price p. We refer to this case as customer directed advertising. 5 An advertising technology is described by a pair {A(n, t), r(n, t)}. The first element of the advertising technology is the cost of the advertising campaign. We denote by A(n, t) the cost of 4 We note first that the modeling of targeting adopted here is consistent with frequently encountered structures of specialized advertising media in which the degree of media specialization is positively correlated with consumers' valuation of the good. Accordingly, in many real-world situations the use of targeted advertising enables the seller to concentrate ads on the most eager consumers. Second, the specification adopted here rules out the possibility of sending different messages to disjunct sets of buyers. If this was possible, the seller's opportunities to segment the market would be unlimited, and, consequently, he would be able to practice third-degree (or even first-degree) price discrimination. 5 We note that in our setting every customer-directed ad returns a sale; this is a simplification. More realistically, we could assume, like in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) , that the entire population of consumers has size M > 1
and that only a unit mass of those customers are interested in the good. In this way, some of the ads could go to consumers who are not interested in the product.
placing n ads of target t. For a given target t, we assume that A 0 n (n, t) > 0, i.e., advertising costs increase with the number of ads acquired. The second element of the advertising technology is the probability r(n, t) ∈ [0, 1] with which each consumer becomes informed about the existence, quality and price of the good, when the seller acquires n ads of target t. In other words, r(·) is the chance that a targeted consumer sees at least one advertisement. We assume that, given a target t, this probability increases with the number of ads n placed by the seller, i.e., r 0 n (n, t) > 0. So far we have not imposed any structure on how advertising costs A(·) and advertising effectiveness r(·) relate to the target t. In this regard, we note that in the communication industry the choice of targeting strategy by marketing and advertising managers is based both on cost considerations and on a comparison between the audience of the media and the marketing target of the new product corresponding to the potential demand. The marketing literature indeed postulates that firms usually choose their communication media aiming at minimizing the cost per "effective ad-exposed audience" of potential buyers (Kotler, 2002) . According to this intuition we shall distinguish among advertising technologies based on the following properties.
Definition 1:
We say that an advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)} exhibits "economies of targeting" whenever, for any given number of advertisements n, it holds that
If the opposite holds, we shall say that the advertising technology presents "diseconomies of targeting".
In words, an advertising technology exhibits economies of targeting when the advertising cost per informed potential buyer falls as the target t decreases. 6 We note that this property, according to the marketing literature, should be sufficient for customer directed advertising to arise in equilibrium.
Building on Definition 1, we now present a stronger property of an advertising technology that enables us to derive clear-cut results regarding the monopolist's choice of advertising strategy.
Definition 2:
We say that an advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)} presents "strong economies of targeting" whenever, for any given number of advertisements n, (i) A 0 t (n, t) > 0, and (ii) r 0 t (n, t) < 0.
In words, an advertising technology exhibits strong economies of targeting when, for a given number of ads n, advertising cost decreases and the number of informed consumers that are poten- 6 Notice that this interpretation implicitly assumes t ≥ Q, a condition that, as we will see later, holds in equilibrium.
cial buyers, i.e., Q r(n, t), increases as target t decreases. If conditions (i) and (ii) hold with the opposite sign, we shall say that the advertising technology presents "strong diseconomies of targeting." We observe that an advertising technology which exhibits strong economies of targeting also presents economies of targeting but the reverse implication does not hold.
We conclude this Section by relating the advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)} formulated above to a number of specific advertising technologies that have appeared in the economics literature on advertising. This literature has typically modelled advertising via a cost of message production. Imposing a particular structure on A(n, t) and r(n, t), our general advertising technology can encompass these advertising cost functions. As a result, these examples can be seen as particular cases of {A(·), r(·)}. We note that most of the literature has analyzed the case of mass advertising, i.e., t = 1. Recent research by Hernández (1997) and Esteban et al. (2001) allows for advertising that can be targeted to the buyers with higher valuations.
Examples:
(i ) Grossman and Shapiro (1984, p. 65) present an advertising cost function that generalizes the specification in Butters (1977) . In their paper a seller has no ability to target advertisements to particular segments of the potential market. Therefore t = 1. The per firm expenditure needed to reach a proportion φ of the consumers is A(φ), with A 0 φ > 0. To establish a connection between this advertising technology and {A(n, t), r(n, t)}, we note that in our model r(·) is monotone in n. As a result we can obtain the number of advertisements to be placed in the mass media so that a consumer sees an ad with probability r, i.e., n = r −1 (r, 1). Substituting n in A(·) yields A(r −1 (r, 1), 1) = A(r). Setting r = φ, the equivalence follows. An advertising cost function a la Grossman and Shapiro has also been used in, for example, Caminal (1996) , Moraga-González and Petrakis (1999), Robert and Stahl (1993) and Stahl (1995) .
(ii) A number of these papers have used specific functional forms to derive explicit solutions.
A commonly used family of advertising cost functions is the polynomial: A(φ) = kφ β , with β > 1.
We note that under this specification the advertising cost function presents constant-elasticity. Our advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)} accommodates this family of advertising cost functions by imposing the following structure on A(·) and r(·). Consider that the cost per ad of target t is a(t), and that the cost of sending n ads of target t is linear, i.e., A(n, t) = na(t). Then, setting r(n, t) = n α f (t) we obtain
Setting a(1) = k, β = 1/α and r/f(1) = φ, the equivalence follows.
(iii) Specialized magazines with nested readerships (Esteban et al., 2001 ). This distribution of media 7 assumes that for any t ∈ [0, 1] there is a large number of specialized magazines with readerships on the support [0, t], in such a way that a seller can target high-valuation consumers by carefully selecting a set of these magazines. In this context, the per firm expenditure needed to target a proportion φ of the consumers whose valuations lie in the set [0, t] is A(φ, t) = n(φ, t) a(t),
where z(t) is the readership of a magazine with target t. Our advertising technology accommodates a distribution of magazines with nested readerships assuming that A(n, t) = na(t) and r(n, t) =
t´n . Setting φ = r, the equivalence follows. 8 
Analysis
The monopolist's problem consists in choosing a tuple {p, s, t, n} so as to maximize profits. In this Section we address two issues: first, we ask whether and under which conditions the different advertising strategies (mass, targeted and customer directed advertising) arise in equilibrium. Second, we analyze whether different advertising strategies have a bearing on the optimal price-quality choice of the firm and its ability to exercise market power. 7 Specialized magazines have often nested readerships. For instance, there are magazines containing general information on sports, medicine, computers, family matters, etc., as compared to those specialized in particular sports (soccer, basketball, golf, etc.), medical specialities (surgery, radiology, dermatology, etc.), computer issues (videogames, Internet, etc.) or leisure activities (fitness, decoration, gardening, etc.). We provide details of these structures for the case of medicine and computer magazines in Tables 2 and 3 in Section 5. 8 In fact, our advertising technology can be interpreted more broadly. For example, we can consider a nested distribution of magazines with only one magazine available for each target t. In this alternative framework, n should be interpreted as the advertising effort exerted in a single magazine -e.g. the number of ads inserted in the magazine, the size and color of the ad, etc.-. Finally, our model accommodates other types of specialized advertising media such as cable television or radio. These media might not be nested, in such a way that the ads could be distributed in any interval in the set [0, t].
For future reference, let us denote (p m , s m ) as the equilibrium price-quality pair under full-
and π m = π(p m , s m ). The optimal target of the advertising campaign, i.e., the nature of the advertising strategy, will depend on the properties of the advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)}.
Our first result states the conditions under which mass and targeted advertising are to be observed in equilibrium, and their implications for the market outcome.
Proposition 1 (i) Mass advertising arises in equilibrium if and only if π m r 0 t (n, t) − A 0 t (n, t) > 0. Targeted advertising arises in equilibrium if and only if there exists t ∈ (q m , 1) such that π m r 0 t (n, t)− A 0 t (n, t) = 0.
(ii) The seller's price-quality choice under both mass and targeted advertising is equal to (p m , s m ). (iii) Moreover, under an advertising technology of constant-elasticity, targeted advertising is more intense than mass advertising.
We now elaborate on some aspects of this result. We note first that the conditions sufficing for mass and targeted advertising to arise in equilibrium are intimately related to the nature of the advertising technology. In particular, we observe that strong diseconomies of targeting suffices for a mass advertising strategy, whereas the conditions necessary to employ both mass and targeted advertising are incompatible with the property of strong economies of targeting. Secondly, the price-quality choice of the monopolist under both mass and targeted advertising maximizes the full information profit. The reason is that under these advertising strategies, a direct connection between the size of the potential demand and the advertising effort does not exist. Indeed, a marginal change in advertising intensity does not affect the difference between marginal revenue and marginal cost. As a result, neither the equilibrium price nor the quality level depends on the advertising effort. However, this result does not imply that mass and targeted advertising necessarily lead to exactly the same market outcome. The difference between these advertising strategies is the intensity with which the seller promotes sales. Proposition 1,(iii ) suggests that, typically, the higher effectiveness embodied in a targeted advertising strategy compared to a mass advertising strategy will lead the firm to acquire a number of ads greater under the former strategy than under the latter. Taking into account that from a social perspective a monopolist always undersupplies informative advertising (Shapiro, 1980) , it follows that the use of targeted advertising is in fact welfare improving.
We now turn to analyze the case in which the seller promotes sales by using a customer directed advertising strategy. Our first observation is that a monopolist will never choose a target t and a price-quality pair (p, s), such that Q(p, s) > t. Further, we establish sufficient conditions for customer directed advertising to arise in equilibrium, and note that this advertising strategy has an important bearing on the market outcome. Let (q d , p d , s d ) denote the equilibrium quantity, price and quality of the seller under customer directed advertising. Then:
We now comment on these results. We first recall that the marketing literature has reported a positive correlation between the use of customer directed advertising and the existence of economies of targeting. However, our theoretical results show that strong economies of targeting, and not simply economies of targeting, suffice for customer directed advertising. These two views can be easily reconciled since, as we argue in Section 5 where we present data about advertising costs and effectiveness in specialized magazines, it seems that advertising technologies indeed exhibit strong economies of targeting. Since the existence of this type of economies implies economies of targeting, this explains the reported observation.
Proposition 2 also shows that the seller's ability to target advertisements to those consumers who will surely acquire the advertised price-quality combination has profound implications for quantity and quality provision. To the best of our knowledge, the fact that advertising strategy has a bearing on product design strategies is novel in the literature. We now elaborate on the economic intuition behind the nature of this relationship.
One, under customer directed advertising, any variation in the seller's price-quality choice modifies the size of the targeted segment t = Q(p, s), which in turn has a bearing on advertising costs. This is the fundamental feature of customer directed advertising: it establishes a direct linkage between the size of the potential demand and the cost of the advertising campaign. This in turn
gives the firm incentives to deviate from the equilibrium price-quality choice under full information.
Two, a monopolist who employs customer directed advertising puts fewer units in the market;
this implies that the typical quantity distortion introduced by a monopolist is greater under cus-tomer directed advertising than under full information. For a given level of quality, this translates immediately into a higher price.
Three, we note that the level of quality supplied by the firm is also distorted. Interestingly, the direction of this distortion is sensitive to the nature of product quality. We distinguish between two cases. On the one hand, when the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is higher for those consumers who have higher valuations for the good (high-end quality), i.e., when P 00 sq < 0, then, relative to the full information benchmark, quality is distorted upwards. By contrast, when the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality is higher for those consumers who have lower valuations (low-end quality), i.e., when P 00 sq > 0, then quality is distorted downwards. In order to understand the economic intuition behind this result, note that the incentives of the seller to invest in quality provision are related to the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality of the marginal consumer (see first order condition (9) in the Appendix). Since the quantity put in the market under customer directed advertising is lower than the full information quantity, the question is whether the marginal consumer in the first case is willing to pay more or less for quality than the marginal consumer in the second case. When P 00 sq < 0 the marginal consumer under customer directed advertising values more quality than that under full information and, consequently, the seller invests in quality upgrading. By contrast, when P 00 sq > 0 the opposite holds and the seller downgrades quality.
To account for price distortions, we note that both the quantitative as well as the qualitative implications of this advertising strategy must be taken into consideration. Under high-end quality, the price charged by the monopolist is higher, whereas under low-end quality the price may either increase or decrease. Thus, a noteworthy result is that, unlike those results reported in previous work on this issue, we show that the use of customer directed advertising can lead to a lower market price. Further, this advertising strategy could also be accompanied by fewer units of lower quality offered at a higher price. This, of course, has a negative impact on consumer surplus, which calls for an examination of the welfare implications of customer directed advertising.
Welfare
We address three issues in this Section. The first pertains to the conditions under which a social planner uses customer directed advertising to promote sales. The second compares the social incentives for quantity and quality provision under customer directed advertising and the full infor-mation benchmark. Finally, we examine how the private adoption of customer directed advertising affects the monopolist's ability to exercise market power and the level of social welfare.
As a welfare measure, we take the conventional expression of gross consumer surplus minus production and advertising costs:
W (q, s, n, t) = q Z 0 P (µ, s) dµ r(n, t) − c(s) r(n, t) − A(n, t).
Let (q * , s * ) be the optimal quantity and quality put in the market by a social planner under full information. Likewise, denote (q * d , s * d ) as the quantity and quality socially optimal under customer directed advertising.
Proposition 3 (i) If there are strong economies of targeting, the planner promotes sales by customer directed advertising. (ii) Under customer directed advertising, the socially optimal quantityquality choice is such that q * d < q * , and s * d < s * .
Proposition 3 shows that the social incentives to choose a customer directed advertising strategy are somewhat aligned with the private incentives; indeed, when the advertising technology presents strong economies of targeting both the monopolist and the planner promote sales through customer directed advertising. However, the Proposition also shows that the social and private incentives for quantity and quality provision may be misaligned. With customer directed advertising, the social planner always restricts the quantity and downgrades the quality of the product. The first effect is in line with the monopolist's decision; by contrast, the monopolist may upgrade quality in some cases (see Proposition 2) . This misalignment between the private and the social incentives to alter quality arises because while the seller only cares about the willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality of the marginal consumer (see equation (9) in the Appendix), the social planner is concerned with the aggregate willingness to pay for an extra unit of quality (see (13) ).
These remarks lead us to ask whether the current proliferation of specialized advertising technologies may lead to a deterioration of social welfare. To answer this question, we examine whether the private adoption of customer directed advertising leads to a lower social welfare than mass advertising. Of course, this examination is in the spirit of a second best analysis. Unfortunately, we have been unable to offer a general characterization of the conditions under which the private adoption of customer directed advertising reduces welfare relative to mass advertising. To gain further insight on this issue, we have chosen to solve our model for a particular family of demand and cost functions. This family encompasses models often employed in the literature and captures the distinction we have made above regarding the nature of product quality. We now present the details of this specification.
Demand function:
We assume that market demand stems from a unitary mass of consumers characterized by a taste parameter θ uniformly distributed in the unit interval. A consumer's utility is U = θ + f(s) − θg(s) − p, when he buys the good of quality s at price p, with f(s) ≥ 0, f(s) − θ g(s) ≥ 0, and
No consumption gives zero utility. The economic interpretation of this utility function is the following: (i) Since θ > 0, consumers enjoy the good per se; (ii) f(s) ≥ 0 indicates that consumers may attach value to quality per se, independently of the taste parameter; finally,
imply that consumers always prefer higher qualities. 9 We note that this manner of modelling vertical product differentiation encompasses a number of utility functions frequently found in the literature. 10 Standard derivations yield a
and g(s) = 1 − 1/s k−1 , which satisfy the above conditions for all θ ∈ [0, 1] when k ≥ 0 and s > 1.
It obtains that Q(p, s) = s k (1 − p/s). We note that k < 1 refers to high-end quality, a situation where quality attributes are more valued by the consumers who are willing to pay more for the product, i.e., P 00 sq < 0; by contrast, k > 1 gathers the case of low-end quality, i.e. P 00 sq > 0. Finally, the case k = 1 can be regarded as a neutral case.
Advertising and production cost functions:
We consider the advertising technology {A(n, t), r(n, t)} = {na(t), n α f(t)}. As pointed out above, this advertising technology encompasses the family of polynomial advertising cost functions with constant elasticity. We further assume that f(t) = t −α and α = 1/2. Furthermore, we note that, in line with the empirical evidence we shall provide later, a is rather insensitive to t; thus, for the sake of simplicity, we assume a(t) = a(1) = a. Finally, we employ a marginal cost specification quadratic in quality, c(s) = bs 2 /2.
With these market conditions at hand, we can obtain the equilibrium market allocations and 9 We note that this specification allows for the valuation of quality to be positively or negatively related to the taste parameter, i.e., we do not place any restriction on the sign of g(s). advertising intensities under mass and customer directed advertising, respectively:
On the basis of these results, we can compute the impact that moving from a mass advertising strategy to a customer directed advertising strategy has on social welfare. Table 1 for various values of the parameter k. These values have been chosen so that they generate an advertising cost-to-sales ratio ranging from 8% to 25%. This is consistent with the stylized fact that when a firm launches a new product, it usually incurs an advertising cost that represents an average of about 20% of sales (Kotler and Armstrong, 1998 Table 1 shows a number of issues. The first is that the welfare implications of customer directed advertising are sensitive to the quality attributes of the product. In particular, on average, the size of the sets Ω and Θ relative to the set Ψ is greater for k > 1 than for k < 1. This implies that the set of parameters for which consumer surplus and welfare decrease when P 00 sq < 0 is larger than when P 00 sq > 0, which reveals the importance of the way consumers value product quality. The second issue we see is that the size of Ω relative to Ψ is generally quite small. This suggests that, even though the possibility that customer directed advertising leads to a welfare decrease cannot be excluded in this model, the likelihood of occurrence of this event is not large. Finally, additional computations yield that, on average, the maximum potential loss for consumers is 33%, whereas the maximum potential social welfare loss is 7.8%. In summary, the analysis of Table 1 suggests that the transition from mass to customer directed advertising is likely to be welfare improving, but may well decrease consumer surplus. We now elaborate on the intuition behind these insights.
We distinguish among two cases to gain in exposition clarity.
Case 1: high-end quality ( P 00 sq < 0; 0 ≤ k < 1). As compared to the use of mass advertising, a customer directed advertising strategy leads to a reduction in the number of units of output that the firm puts in the market. This quantitativeeffect has two major implications associated. First, since quality attributes are more valued by the consumers who are willing to pay more for the product, a quantity cut implies that the firm targets its ads to consumers with a higher willingness to pay for quality. This leads the seller to increase the supply of quality. This qualitative-effect increases the marginal cost of quality provision c(s), which tends to reduce the firm's ability to exercise market power. Secondly, the quantitative-effect has a bearing on the market price. This is given by
Since P 00 sq < 0, both terms in this equation work in the same direction and, therefore, there is a price-effect which also tends to increase the firm's ability to exercise market power, dP/dq < 0. The case k = 0 (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) is special, in the sense that the price-effect entirely offsets the quality-effect; this yields the remark that when consumers do not value quality per se, the use of customer directed advertising need not affect the firm's ability to exercise market power. Since this ability remains unaltered in such a case, the higher advertising efficiency associated to customer directed advertising implies that this advertising strategy is beneficial for the consumers and for the society as a whole. By contrast, if 0 < k < 1, the price-effect dominates and thus the use of customer directed advertising generates a trade-off between a higher advertising efficiency and a greater exercise of monopoly power, which might lead to a welfare loss. For example, if k = 0.5, consumer surplus decreases when b < 0.19, whereas welfare decreases when b < 0.08 (Table 1) .
Case 2: low-end quality ( P 00 sq > 0; k > 1) In this situation the quantitative effect leads the firm to target consumers with a lower valuation of quality, which in turn drives the monopolist to reduce the supply of quality. Thus, the qualitativeeffect is positive; this tends to further exercise market power. Moreover, the fact that the second term in the RHS of equation (1) above is positive, implies that the market price might fall, and so the price-effect could reduce firm's exercise of market power. In our example, the qualitative-effect is always stronger than the price-effect and the use of customer directed advertising increases the firm's ability to exercise market power substantially. 11 In summary, our analysis shows that the impact of customer directed advertising on both the firm's ability to exercise market power and social welfare, depends crucially on the nature of product quality. Under high-end quality, the transition from mass to customer directed advertising results in a moderate (or null) increase in the firm's ability to exercise market power, whereas under low-end quality monopoly power increases substantially. Thus, we conclude that the the use of customer directed advertising is more (less) likely to have a positive impact on welfare in a setting of high-end (low-end) quality.
Some evidence on strong economies of targeting
The interest of the results in this paper depends on the practical relevance of customer directed advertising. To shed some light on this point, it is convenient to find empirical evidence about the conditions under which this advertising practice arises in the model. The two crucial issues are the relationship between target audience and advertising costs A 0 t (n, t), and the relationship between the probability with which a consumer sees an advertisement and the target of the advertising campaign r 0 t (n, t). In the absence of comprehensive empirical studies reporting the necessary information, we have undertaken a first attempt to sign these derivatives. In what follows, we report the results of a careful examination of a particular advertising technology for which we have found the necessary data, namely, that of specialized magazines with nested readerships. The 'Handbook of the Dutch Press and Publicity (2001)' (Handboek van de Nederlandse Pers en Publiciteit, 2001) provides readerships and advertising rates for a very large set of magazines; these magazines are classified according to the field, subject or topic they treat. 12 The different contents of various magazines 1 1 It may also be the case that P 00 sq = 0 ( k = 1). In this case, there is no quality-effect and thus the price effect is unambiguously negative. As a result, the use of customer directed advertising always increases the firm's ability to exercise market power. 1 2 We also analyzed the data reported in the 'Spanish Guide to the Communication Media' (1999) (Guía de los Medios de Comunicación de España, 1999), which yielded a similar insight.
can be seen as distinct degrees of specialization; we note that this is precisely the manner in which the Handbook interprets them. Of course, our results should only be taken as weak evidence on the nature of these signs.
Some evidence on the signs of A 0 t (n, t) and r 0 t (n, t) : We first report evidence gathered by us supporting the view that A 0 t (n, t) > 0. The information contained in the tables 2 and 3 below has been compiled from the Handbook. To illustrate, we next discuss in some detail the case of medicine magazines (Table 2 ). These are magazines generally read by the health care community. In line with the Handbook, in Table 2 , we have grouped some of these magazines in distinct categories, which correspond to the professional field in which (most of) the articles appearing in these magazines belong. It can be seen that there are general medicine magazines, and magazines specialized in Buccal Health, Cardiology, Logopedia and Phonetics, Midwifery, Neurology, Oncology, and Psychiatry. The table reports the readerships and the prices (in Euros) charged for a colored full page advertisement. We note that moving from placing ads in general medicine magazines, like Medisch Vandaag, to advertising in more specialized ones, for instance Tidschrift voor Verloskundigen specialized in midwifery, or Tijdschrift voor Kanker specialized in oncology, is interpreted in our context as concentrating the ads on a particular segment of the market (a decrease in t). Thus, if, for example, a pharmaceutical firm has developed a new drug intended to treat cancer, this firm can place ads in general medicine magazines, or in magazines specialized in oncology.
Name of magazine

Description
Readership Ad price We have carried out the same examination for other markets, like the market for computers and computer software, or the market for leisure activities. In the market for computers, for instance, inspection of the Handbook reveals that there are general computer magazines and magazines specialized in Atari computers, Macintosh computers, the Nintendo 64 console, the Wordperfect word processor, the Internet, etc. (see Table 3 ). Using the information provided in Tables 2 and 3 , we can analyze the sign of A 0 t (n, t). For this purpose, we notice that, for the advertising technology under consideration, A 0 t (n, t) = na 0 (t) (see example (iii) in Section 3) and readily compute a 0 (t) ' ∆a/∆t, where a(t) is approximated by the average cost per ad of the set of magazines with target t. As a proxy for t to be used in the computations, we have chosen the largest readership of those magazines with the same degree of specialization. Table 4 provides these results.
Magazines
Av. Ad price a(t) Target t a 0 (t) Table 4 . Empirical Evidence on Dutch Magazines: A 0 t (n, t)
The empirical evidence reported in Table 4 indicates that moving an advertising campaign from less to more specialized magazines yields a cost saving, i.e., A 0
Av. Readership z(t) Target t Table 5 . Empirical Evidence on Dutch Magazines: r 0 t (n, t)
This empirical evidence suggests that r 0 t (n, t) is generally negative, which means that a monopolist (and a planner) should generally choose customer directed advertising to promote sales. Seen from another point of view, the joint evidence reported in Tables 4 and 5 suggests that the conditions which are necessary for mass advertising as well as targeted advertising to arise in equilibrium do not hold. As a result, our empirical exercise seen along with our theoretical results suggests that targeted advertising may become more predominant over time, which is consistent with the fact that nowadays mass advertising only accounts for less than 30 percent of total advertising expenditures (Kotler and Armstrong, 1998).
Conclusions
We have studied an economy where a single seller launches a new product of observable quality.
Central to our analysis is the fact that consumers are, in principle, unaware of the existence and the characteristics of the product. This implies that the seller would face no positive demand unless he invested in an advertising campaign to promote sales of his product. We have identified three possible advertising strategies at the disposal of the seller: mass advertising, targeted advertising and customer directed advertising. The feature that distinguishes these advertising strategies is the target of the advertising campaign, that is, the set of consumers to whom the seller distributes ads.
We have studied the conditions under which different advertising strategies arise in equilibrium. In addition, we have explored the implications that distinct advertising strategies have on the pricequality choice of the monopolist. Finally, we have examined the welfare implications associated to the adoption of a customer directed advertising strategy.
We have found that the choice of advertising strategy by the seller is intimately related to the properties of the advertising technology at his disposal. When the advertising technology exhibits strong economies of targeting, then the monopolist promotes sales through customer directed advertising. This is a strategy under which the ads are targeted to those consumers who are willing to buy the price-quality combination supplied by the firm. In such a case, we have shown that, compared to the market allocation under full information, the seller puts fewer units in the market, and distorts the quality and the price in a manner that is sensitive to the quality attributes of the product. By contrast, a mass advertising strategy as well as a targeted advertising strategy has no impact on the market outcome. We have also gathered empirical evidence supporting the view that the conditions under which customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium seem to be more plausible than those under which mass advertising and targeted advertising arise.
We have also compared the social and the private incentives to use customer directed advertising and the incentives for quantity and quality provision. We have found that a social planner has incentives to use customer directed advertising somewhat in line with those of the seller. However, the social incentives for quantity and quality provision may differ from those of the monopolist.
Indeed, while the social planner always restricts quantity and quality the monopolist may upgrade quality. This potential misalignment of incentives may lead to a welfare loss when the seller uses customer directed advertising. We have seen that this potential welfare loss is less likely in a setting of high-end quality.
The most fascinating research extension of our model consists of analyzing advertising directed to the customers in an oligopoly setting. In a homogeneous product market, Roy (2000) has analyzed this issue in a two-stage model where firms first advertise and then set their prices. In his model, the advertising technology has the nature of direct-marketing, which differs from ours since distinct firms are able to target ads to disjunct sets of consumers in his paper; moreover, advertising has a long run nature and investments in advertising enable firms to strategically segment the market. However, in a large number of markets advertising has a short run nature instead and such segmentation cannot arise in equilibrium. We expect the analysis of oligopolistic advertising with the specification of our paper to lead quite distinct results compared to Roy (2000) . Moreover, we believe the conditions under which customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium to be weaker under oligopoly than under monopoly. To see this, consider for example a duopoly model of vertical differentiation á la Cremer and Thisse (1994) . In this model, firms put in the market distinct qualities in an attempt to reduce price competition. It is easy to see that, for any given pair of qualities, under a customer directed advertising strategy, low-quality consumers would only be aware of the product offering of the low-quality firm. This strategic effect weakens competition between the firms and thus increases the incentives of the high-quality firm to use a targeting advertising strategy. Furthermore, this may have a bearing on quality provision. Thus, if customer directed advertising arises in equilibrium, the market allocation will probably differ substantially from that under full information, and thus a welfare analysis is called for to be able to evaluate the social welfare implications of targeting technologies in oligopoly. This is work that we are pursuing in a separate paper.
where the last inequality follows from the fact that t ∈ ( b t, 1); the result follows. The proof is now complete.
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) By way of contradiction, assume that Q(p, s) > t > 0. Then, the profits of the monopolist are given by Π(·) = (p − c(s))tr(n, t) − A(n, t), which decrease monotonically with s. Therefore, in equilibrium, any t < Q(p, s) should be accompanied by s = 0. However, Q(p, 0) = 0 < t for any t, which constitutes a contradiction.
(ii) • We note that if conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 2 above hold, then (p−c(s))Q(p, s)r 0 t (n, t)− A 0 t (n, t) < 0. But this implies that the first derivative of the seller's profit function with respect to t is always negative. Consequently, t = Q(p, s).
• Economies of targeting ; targeted or customer directed advertising.
An advertising technology presentes economies of targeting if
A 0 t (n, t) r(n, t) − r (p − c(s)) Q(p, s) r(n, t) E r − A(n, t) E A ≤ 0 Now consider the case E A > 0, E r > 0 and E A > E r . Under these conditions, the advertising technology presents economies of targeting but, given that the condition for positive profits requires (p − c(s)) Q(p, s) r(n, t) > A(n, t) it might be the case that the firm does not adopt either targeted or customer directed advertising.
(iv ) It is useful to employ the inverse demand function to write the problem of the monopolist under customer directed advertising as follows:
Max {q,s,n} [P (q, s) − c(s)]qr(n, q) − A(n, q)
The first order conditions of this problem are:
[P (q, s) + P 
Note first that the optimal quality choice does not depend directly on the number of ads acquired n. Let us denote the solution of (9) as s = s d (q). The fact that customer directed advertising occurs in equilibrium implies that [P (q, s) − c(s)]qr 0 q (n, q) − A 0 q (n, q) < 0. Therefore, a solution to equations (8) and (9) (c) Notice that dP (q, s(q))/dq = P 0 q + P 0 s s 0 q . Since P 00 sq < 0 implies s 0 q < 0, the result follows. 
which holds, given Definition 2.
(ii) Under full information, the first order conditions with respect to q and s are 
respectively. Under customer directed advertising, t = Q(p, s) and the first order conditions with respect to q and s are, in this case, 
respectively. If s * (q) and s * d (q) are solutions to (13) and (15), respectively, then it follows that s * (q) ≡ s * d (q). Thus, substituting (13) into (12) yields P (q * , s * (q * )) = c(s * (q * )) or, equivalently, P (q * , s * d (q * ) − c(s * d (q * )) = 0. Moreover, since (11) holds under customer directed advertising, equation (14) 
Since P (q, s) − c(s) is a decreasing function of q (second order conditions), it follows that q * d < q * . Finally, applying the implicit function theorem to (13) , we obtain the nature of the relationship between quality and quantity:
where the inequality follows from the conditions above. Since q * d < q * , it follows that s * d < s * .
